Populism in Old and New Democracies: Comparative Analysis of True Finns, Sweden Democrats, ANO and OĽaNO by Maria Kohutova & Mateja Horvat
3
Populism in Old and New Democracies: 
Comparative Analysis of True Finns, 
Sweden Democrats, ANO and OĽaNO
Maria Kohutova*        
Mateja Horvat**
Abstract
The article aims to critically assess, through discourse analysis of their 
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In recent years, populist parties have been gaining popularity 
among voters. They have gained political power which granted 
them important coalition partners’ mandates. Many authors connect 
this success to globalisation and the cultural and economic anxiety 
that comes with it (Rydgren, 2005; Agerberg, 2017). Populism arises, 
in many cases, as a response to erosion in support for mainstream 
parties (Albertazzi & MacDonnell, 2015: 166), when people complain 
that no one represents their voice (Rydgren, 2004b; Berger, 2017). 
Thus, their increasing political and social importance has been 
attracting political scientists for many years now. This article will 
further explore differences between populist parties in old and 
new democracies in Europe. Democracies with a longer tradition 
of embedded democratic values and institutions as well as electoral 
support might respond to populist challenges in a rather different 
way than the countries that adopted these values no longer than 
three decades ago.
Populism is a chameleonic phenomenon (Rooduijn, de Lange & 
van der Brug, 2014: 564) that many theoreticians also call an ‘empty 
signifier’ (Laclau, 2005) or a ‘loose set of ideas’ (Inglehart & Norris, 
2017) due to the diverse shapes and characteristics which populist 
parties can adopt in their ideology or discourse. Populists can 
move more to the left and appeal to the working class (Lefkofridi 
& Michel, 2017), shift to the right by strengthening national identity 
(Inglehart & Norris, 2017) or do both moves at the same times due 
to their flexible political nature.
Scholars generally refer to the three main perceptions of populism. 
The most common one is defined by Mudde (2004), who calls 
populism ‘a thin ideology’ focused solely on the antagonistic 
relationship between two homogenous groups – the pure people 
and the corrupt elite (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008), where 
“politics should be an expression of volonté générale (general will) of 
the people” (Mudde, 2004: 543). The ideology does not possess any 
coherent ideological tradition, and therefore it is usually attached to 
other ideologies (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: 6).
Another conceptualisation of populism sees it as a form of a political 
strategy that parties, not necessarily only populist, adopt in order to 
attract a broader audience and gain supporters (Pauwels, 2011: 99). 
Their populist slogans are, however, not the only tools for electoral 
mobilisation. Specific features, appealing to ordinary voters, might 
also be found in their party organisation. They generally have a 
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small bureaucratic apparatus and their party cohesion is ensured 
by a strong affinity of party members towards a charismatic leader 
(Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2016: 2). 
The final general perception of populism is as a discursive style 
which holds many similarities with populism as an ideology. It  refers 
mainly to the dichotomy between two homogenous communities. 
However, in this case, populism is not that stable, as it is built on 
the symbolic relationship of ‘Us’ against ‘Them’ (Wodak, 2015). 
This discourse depends on the social context, and ‘Them’ or the 
‘Other’ does not necessarily mean the corrupt establishment, but it 
represents an enemy of the people (‘Us’). By naming the ‘Other’, the 
concept of ‘Us’ could be identified, and, therefore, populism is an 
anti-status-quo discourse (Panizza, 2005: 3). Compared to populism 
as an ideology, the discursive style is a form of political expression, 
which is embodied not only in agitation, speculation, exaggeration, 
but also in deliberate provocations, and it aims at opening political 
and social taboos (Heinisch, 2003: 94). It is a very fluid concept 
that could be strategically used by both the left and the right. The 
analysed parties in this research are scattered across the political 
spectrum; therefore, we applied this conceptualisation of populism 
in our cases.
Regardless of the definition of this concept, scholars cannot agree 
whether populism is a threat to or a corrective for democracy 
(Panizza, 2005; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Mudde and Kaltwasser 
claim that “populism per se is neither good nor bad for the democratic 
system” (2017: 79). Due to their arising political importance, they 
draw electoral support from mainstream parties that changes the 
party politics, government coalitions and public policy-making 
(Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Hooghe & Marks, 2017). Moreover, they 
question the existence of unelected independent institutions 
which protect fundamental rights of the citizens, since these put 
constraints on the power of the demos (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: 
82). Populism supports popular sovereignty and majority rule, but 
in many cases, opposes pluralism and minority rights, which puts 
it not in opposition to democracy per se, but to liberal democracy 
(Rupnik, 2006; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: 95).
On the other hand, Laclau (2005) believes that populism strengthens 
‘democratisation of democracy’, since it mobilises all members 
of society, primarily those that might feel left out by the political 
establishment. This way even excluded groups can express their 
demands, because the primary characteristic of populism is that 
“all the people, and only the people should determine politics” 
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(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: 83). Fârte also claims that populism is 
a side effect of liberal democracy and an indicator of the vitality of 
liberal democracy (Fârte, 2017: 89). If democracy is well-embedded, 
populism cannot threaten its existence. However, if populism arises, 
illiberal majoritarianism can gain enough power to overthrow the 
liberal foundations of the democratic state.
Fârte’s argument also provides a basis for our research, since ‘old 
democracies’ are perceived as those whose democratic values 
and institutions have a longer tradition of independence and 
professionalism (Bugaric, 2008: 198), and thus populism should 
not pose a threat to their highly-functioning democratic system. 
On the other hand, scholars argue that even though EU member 
states from the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region are 
democratic, in many cases the independence of the media or the 
courts’ decisions are disputable, while the protection of human 
rights, in particular minorities, are rather weak or non-existent in the 
context of strong ethnic nationalism (Bugaric, 2008). Since populist 
parties constantly point out the corruptibility of the establishment, 
question traditional liberal institutions and name themselves as the 
only true representatives of the ‘pure people’, they challenge the 
liberal paradigm (Rupnik, 2006: 19) which can in the end cause a 
major shift towards its illiberal opponent.
Experts on populism focused on CEE throughout studies of 
single cases and comparisons of limited number of cases (Ucen, 
2007; Bugaric, 2008), but there are also a few systematic studies 
of populism within this region (Kocijan, 2015). Due to the rising 
dissatisfaction of citizens with the evolution of post-communist 
democracy, populism attracts the attention of academic researchers. 
Since populism is rather flexible, in CEE it adapted to a different 
political and social context than in Western Europe. Their discourse 
differences are visible in the definition of the ‘Other’ (Ţăranu, 2012: 
134). In Western European states, the ‘Other’ symbolises an external 
threat that endangers the homogeneity of the nation, which mainly 
includes immigrants. On the other hand, in Eastern European 
discourse, the ‘Other’ is depicted as an insider who co-exists with 
the majority population for a longer period of time, which usually 
refers to the Roma people, Jews or Hungarians, or an external enemy 
such as Russia (Ţăranu, 2012: 138). Mudde reasons this difference 
with tolerance of racism and anti-Semitism which he holds to be 
more widespread in CEE than in the West (Mudde, 2005: 161).
Another difference can be found in the anti-establishment discourse. 
Pareto states that an anti-elitism rhetoric in CEE is often connected 
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with national communism, which practically means that populists 
target the main left-wing party, which is generally perceived as a 
party succeeding their previous communist counterparts (Pareto, 
2011). In Western Europe populists attract mainly those who felt 
at loss because of globalisation, while in the East they attract those 
who are unsatisfied with the democratic transition, while the 
number of such people is increasing with spreading corruption 
and economic downturn (Ţăranu, 2012: 136). Some scholars 
question the anti-systemic characteristics of populist parties in CEE 
since the system has not yet stabilised in the western form and is 
relentlessly under pressure from the nationalist backlash and anti-
consensual sentiment (Pauwels, 2011: 1009; Ţăranu, 2012: 137). 
These arguments will be further tested in the comparison of Eastern 
and Western European populists which might bring more insight 
into this complex topic.
Methods of Analysis and Data
Four actors – True Finns (PS), Sweden Democrats (SD), ANO and 
OĽaNO – were chosen for the analysis of the populist parties and 
their impact on democracy. These parties were selected since they 
are well-established and relevant actors in the domestic political 
arena, even though their party affiliation is not the same. The 
populists from the Czech Republic and Slovakia belong more to 
the centre-right of the political spectrum, while the Scandinavian 
parties are leaning more towards the far-right side. However, an 
identical position in the political spectrum was not a relevant factor 
since the research is aimed at discourse, in which ideology can vary 
with populists’ ideology. Another reason is that far-right parties in 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia only have a marginal or volatile 
position, and thus their impact on the democratic composition of the 
state and politics might not be significant. This way, the reliability 
of the research is assured. 
Since populism as a discourse is the main subject of the study, 
discourse analysis was determined as the best method to be applied. 
Discourse analysis is a method of research which encompasses 
a number of approaches which analyse written, vocal or sign 
language (Machin & Mayr, 2012: 16). In this research, frame analysis 
is utilized as a part of the broader discourse analysis research 
strategy. The goal is to identify the frames used by the populist in 
order to explain their discursive style. All choices will serve to draw 
attention to certain aspects of identity that will be associated with 
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certain kinds of discourses (Machin & Mayr, 2012: 77). Discourse 
analysis in political science is a qualitative approach to the study 
of politics which aims at critically assessing the way language is 
used in order to achieve a goal (Machin & Mayr, 2012: 15). It is a 
useful tool to understand how language forms ideas, ideology and 
political reality by allowing the examiner to access written, spoken 
or visual content, dissect it, and make sense of it through critically 
assessing it in order to see the way words and images form reality 
and in what way they do so. The most critical downside is that it 
is very open to self-interpretation of the language and is thus on 
the subjective side (Machin & Mayr, 2012). To avoid bias, discourse 
analysis does not offer normative suggestions and conclusions, but 
rather, again, as in the actual assessment, leaves it up for critical 
evaluation by the readers themselves.
There are three most common discourse approaches that are used in 
the study of populism (Poblete, 2015: 202). The first one is the post-
structuralist approach, based on Laclau’s theory, and it is the broadest 
theoretical approach. Here, every social practice has a meaning and 
is considered as constituting discourse; everything has political 
potential (Poblete, 2015). The second approach also understands 
populism as discourse, but in a more postmodern sense, as a set of 
ideas or latent frameworks of meaning, unintentionally manifested 
by individuals through speech, writing or some other type of 
symbolic action (Hawkins, 2009). The third approach understands 
discourse as an explicit linguistic allocution, clearly stated in the 
context of text and it has roots in the field of content analysis (Jagers & 
Walgrave, 2007). In this research, the second approach was utilized. 
The reason lies in the fact that the post-structuralist approach has 
a methodological weakness – it is missing clear research strategies, 
while the third approach is purely positivist and quantitative. The 
second approach proposes a hermeneutic way of accessing the 
discourse but within a positivist research context. It is possible to 
access the latent meaning of the text through interpretative analysis 
and subsequently classify evidence to defined positivist categories, 
which are following further down this section.
In the study of populism, scholars focus mainly on the binary 
relationship between the people and the establishment. This will be 
analysed in our cases since a contemporary comparative study of 
these regions is missing in academia. Moreover, researchers found 
many differences in the discourse of Eastern and Western populists, 
which pose as our main categories, and which this research will also 
test.
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1. Definition of the People – opposite to the enemy based on 
populist perception of divided society stemming from the theory 
of social mental landscape (Derks, Ötsch, & Walker, 2016). ‘We’ 
who are located in proximate distance such as ‘we stand together’ 
– and ‘Them’, who are placed far away from us. This phenomenon 
is connected to the process of de-personification in which people 
who are portrayed as being further away are perceived less as ‘real 
people’.
2. Definition of the Enemy 
a) Cultural Enemy – Eastern European populists are expected 
to be more xenophobic, even racist, due to their embedded 
nationalism. However, they should focus mainly on the internal 
culturally different groups, such as Roma or Hungarians. With 
the refugee crisis, it is presupposed that they will also focus on the 
external enemy – refugees. Western populists should focus mainly 
on immigrants who are threatening their national homogeneity, but 
they should not so openly be proponents of racism.
b) The Establishment – Eastern populists use anti-establishment 
discourse to target national-communist parties as the ‘establishment’ 
since these remnants of the communist regime are threatening the 
‘pure people’. On the other hand, the fight of the Western populists 
is of more general nature, since they should depict establishment as 
those who do not comply with the volonté générale. 
3. Populism and Democracy – the main positive effect of populism 
was its inclusive character for all groups in society. Thus, in case they 
devote their attention to potentially excluded groups from society—
not necessarily based on ethnicity, but any groups who are seen 
as dependants in society—the impact of populism on democracy 
might be rather stimulating. On the other hand, a negative effect 
on democracy might occur in cases when they question or criticise 
democratic institutions and values. There is no assumption which 
parties might be more corrective to (liberal) democracy.
The data chosen for this analysis consists of the last parliamentary 
elections’ programmes in respective countries. This data source 
was selected because parliamentary elections are not that affected 
by a low turnout as e.g. European Parliament elections, which 
means that these first-order elections are the most important for all 
citizens and include agenda that should involve everyone. It is also 
a rather complex document which indicates a more stable discourse 
of parties. In comparison to for instance press releases, in which 
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the party rhetoric might be more fluid, the comparison of findings 
might not be very reliable. 
Even though the programmes were issued in different years (Sweden 
Democrats in 2014, True Finns in 2015, OĽaNO in 2016 and ANO in 
2017) and only two parties could respond to the refugee crisis of 2015 
in their programmes, the crisis per se was not perceived as a crucial 
factor. The reason is that in Scandinavia immigration has been one 
of the most salient issues for a longer period of time (Brochmann & 
Hagelund, 2012; Breidahl, 2017), while Czech and Slovak populists 
also had the opportunity to refer to the ‘immigration threat’ from 
which they have been exempt before. Thus, the definition of the 
enemy should not be affected by this.
The Four Populists
Sverigedemokraterna – Sweden Democrats
Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats – SD) is a relatively young 
political party. Formed in 1988, as successors of the Swedish Party 
(Sverigepartiet), which was formed in 1986 by two far-right political 
parties – the Swedish Progressive Party (Framtegspartiet) and Keep 
Sweden Swedish (Bevara Sverige Svenskt) (Rydgren, 2004a). Jimmy 
Åkesson became the party leader in 2005 and since then, the party 
has been trying to reposition and emulate the success of the Danish 
People’s Party and enter the state parliament – Riksdaget. In the 2014 
elections, Sweden Democrats emerged as the third largest party in 
the Swedish Parliament with 12,86% votes won (Val.se, 2014). 
The party can be termed far-right, and it focuses on the national 
identity of Sweden and the composition of the population 
(Nordensvard & Ketola, 2015: 365). The ideological backbone of 
the SD base is based on linking people and culture to the concept 
of a nation state. They take for granted the idea that virtually 
every nation embodies an ethnically determined culture. SD 
nurture a nostalgic relationship with the past, when Sweden was a 
homogenous society (Rydgren, 2004a). Returning to the “good old 
times” is one of the main mechanisms of the populist parties, when 
addressing the voters.
Although the party sees itself above the division between the left 
and the right – they also focus on traditional right-wing issues, 
such as law and order, nationalism and protection of tradition and 
heritage, as well as the protection of the welfare state, care for the 
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elderly and the poor, and the protection of the environment. Radical 
approaches to politics are seen when it comes to national identity, 
history, and common culture and civilization.
Sweden Democrats advocate protecting the welfare state and 
support the idea that tax should not be reduced in order to protect 
the welfare state. Their economic policy somehow tried to move 
away from the right economic standpoint by advocating progressive 
taxes and maintaining the welfare state, provided it is oriented and 
aimed at ethnic Swedes.
The role of the charismatic leader is well in place. Jimmy Åkesson 
plays an important role in the general image of the party. Authors 
suggest that the party elite stands out as their greatest asset (Loxbo, 
2015). David Art strengthens this conclusion by arguing that the top 
leadership of the SD is “a small group of educated men with clean 
records” (Art, 2011: 90). Åkesson and his close affiliates present the 
new face of the Swedish far right, appearing presentable, cultured 
and eloquent. This is, in regard to older ultra-nationalist attempts of 
Swedish far-right parties, a new approach which has in turn proved 
fruitful. 
To summarize, SD are in many ways a populist party with many 
radically right-wing sentiments (nationalism, national state, 
xenophobia, security), but their party programme contains some 
civilized Nordic values, such  as a strong support of the welfare state 
and the opposition to the death-penalty (Nordensvard & Ketola, 
2015: 366). This is especially the case when the SD are surrounded 
by the adherence of Islamic communities in the country, which they 
claim to be against liberal values.
True Finns Party
The True Finns Party was formed in 1995, after the bankruptcy 
of the Finnish Rural Party Suomen maasedun puolue (SMP), under 
the name of True Finns* Perussuomalaisten puolue (PS) (Arter, 2010: 
484-485). SMP framed its political agenda around the interests of 
the rural smallholders and other groups whose interests were not 
served by actions of the political elite, such as the urban working 
class (Nordensvard & Ketola, 2015: 361). True Finns have become 
the third largest party in the 2015 elections, with 19,1% support. 
They entered the ruling coalition together with the Centre Party 
*  In the meantime, PS broke into two parties – the Blue Reform and the Finns Party. 
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and the National Coalition Party (Stat.fi, 2015). 
True Finns are not as nationalistic as the Danish People’s Party or 
the Sweden Democrats, but they do support a mix of traditional 
conservative and nativist values which places the party strongly in 
the populist radical right parties of Europe (Arter, 2010). True Finns 
aim to muster up support for a more nationalistic understanding of 
the Finnish welfare state. Arter points out that the pivotal concept 
in True Finns’ ideology is “the notion of (true) Finnishness” (Arter, 
2010: 502), an idea that informs much of True Finns’ perception of 
Finland’s future (Nordensvard & Ketola, 2015: 361).
They are garnering Eurosceptic beliefs as well as the belief that the 
True Finns should protect the national sovereignty. They present the 
EU as a threat in socio-cultural terms and problematise the current 
political arrangements through the national lens (Nordensvard & 
Ketola, 2015: 364). They also stress the guilt of political elites, who 
are watering down the national welfare state by attacking ‘elitism’ 
of the political class on multiple fronts. They distinguish between 
‘neutral’ and ‘bad’ immigration, accepting positive contribution of 
highly skilled immigrants, while highlighting others as a burden 
(Nordensvard & Ketola, 2015). 
True Finns were led by Timo Soini from 1997 until 2017, who also 
presents the case for a charismatic and outspoken leader, which is 
one of the main characteristics of populist parties. The BBC wrote 
a report on Timo Soini in 2011, saying that “he draws a crowd like 
flypaper catches flies… ...He is a very good talker in a way that 
speaks to common people and makes complicated things look very 
easy” (BBC.com, 2011). 
ANO
The party was established in 2012 as a reaction to the political 
crisis of corruption affairs which resulted in low voters’ support of 
political parties and government* and early parliamentary elections. 
Andrej Babiš, the second-richest Czech businessman (Forbes.com, 
2017), proclaimed himself as a fighter against corrupt elites and 
established the business-firm party ANO which stands for “Action 
of Dissatisfied Citizens”**. The party was set up in a rather unusual 
*  Satisfaction of citizens with the political situation was only around 5%, while confidence 
in the parliament fell to 12% (Havlík, 2015: 301).
**  Translated from Czech: Akce nespokojených občanů. The acronym ANO also means “yes” 
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way since the group of people with similar views was concentrated 
around the leader Babiš, and after that, the political programme 
was modified according to the public opinion (Eibl, 2014: 27). The 
main goal of the party was to establish “a more just society and 
well-functioning rule of law” (ANO Political Programme, 2011). 
ANO achieved huge success after the parliamentary elections in 
2013 when it became the second largest party in the parliament 
with electoral support of almost 19%, which is the best result 
ever recorded for a newly established political party in the Czech 
Republic (Havlík et al., 2014: 144).
Babiš declared that his party will cooperate with anyone whose 
policies are aimed at benefitting the citizens and who will not 
lie and steal (Novinky.cz, 2013). Ideological ambiguity was not 
resolved even after Babiš defined ANO as “a right-wing party with 
a social conscience” (Echo24.cz, 2014). The political programme 
lacks any substance, which on the one hand offers party flexibility, 
and on the other hand, there is space for populist discourse that 
mainly involves the binary relationship between the pure Czech 
nation that has the potential of reaching similar levels to Sweden 
or Switzerland, and incompetent and corrupt elite (Kopeček, 2016: 
742). However, on the European platform they present themselves 
as liberals, as a member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
for Europe.
Moreover, the party also has a rather weak organisational structure 
with one strong leader and several public figures. Kopeček (2016: 
732) even compares Babiš to Berlusconi, with his high public 
popularity*, ownership of media and party organisation in a 
“broader movement of the discontent”, which is not like any other 
political party, which resembles Forza Italia as movimento. Babiš 
was, similarly to Berlusconi, also investigated in relation to the 
unfair practices in tax fraud or manipulation with media, due to 
which the prime minister replaced him as a minister with other 
party members (ČeskéNoviny.cz, 2017). 
However, even these affairs were not fatal for ANO since in the last 
parliamentary elections in 2017 they gained almost 30% of electoral 
support, which brought them the position of the biggest party in 
the parliament. Before the elections, ANO declared the clientelist-
corrupt system as their biggest enemy and the need for majority 
in Czech language, which became part of the main campaign slogans: “Yes, things will get better.”
*  Babiš, with 56% of citizens’ support, was declared as the most trustable Czech politician in 
April 2017 (iDNES.cz, 2017).
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rule, since coalition governments pose problems everywhere in 
Europe. The main problem occurred when nine parties entered 
parliament, and none of them wanted to cooperate with ANO and 
form a coalition (Novinky.cz, 2017). However, ANO is backed by 
the president and the party might form a minority government only 
with independent candidates.
OĽaNO
The party was formed as a movement of ‘Ordinary People’* in 2010 
around the persona of Igor Matovič, reacting to potential gain of 
a constitutional majority of the left-wing party Smer-SD in the 
upcoming elections (SME.sk, 2010). Since political movements 
cannot participate in the election, the members of the movement 
were placed on the bottom of other political parties’ electoral lists. 
However, due to the preferential votes, they entered the parliament. 
This rather unusual political step secured the movement its 
legitimacy which was very important for their future political 
position. They became a coalition partner. However, since other 
parties in the government did not support their bill amendment 
to the Electoral Law, by which even independent candidates could 
run for political positions (Aktuálne.sk, 2011a), they established 
their own political party, OĽaNO**.
In 2012, early elections took place, and OĽaNO became the third 
biggest party in the parliament, winning almost 9% of the overall 
votes (SME.sk, 2012). At the birth of the movement, the main 
ideology was embodied in the fight against corruption (Baboš & 
Malová, 2017: 238), clientelism, nepotism and partocracy (Rolko, 
2010: 27). However, after the incorporation of the independent 
candidates, there is a visible anti-ideological shift. The party believes 
that politicians should follow their own conscience and reason, 
not ideology (Rolko, 2010: 82). Their political programme from 
2012 encompassed rather general goals, such as an anti-corruption 
crusade, transparent and effective public policy, abolition of the 
immunity for politicians or the tangible responsibility for politicians’ 
decisions (IVO.sk, 2012). 
The party itself had only minimal organisational structure, 
*  Translated from Slovak: Obyčajní ľudia.
**  Acronym for: Obyčajní ľudia a Nezávislé Osobnosti (translated from Slovak: Ordinary 
People and Independent Personalities).
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respectively, four members who act as party co-founders and enable 
independent candidates to run for elections through their political 
party (Aktuálne.sk, 2011b). The party is usually associated with the 
leader Matovič, a small businessman and the owner of a regional 
magazine, who is also an avid political critic and represents the 
loudest opposition towards unfair practices of all political parties. 
He claimed he became a politician in order to ‘oust the thieves’, 
which eventually transformed into a campaign against the leader 
of the left-wing party Fico, with the main slogan: “Fico protects 
the thieves” (HNonline.sk, 2016). It was printed on T-shirts that 
Matovič was wearing in the parliamentary hearings. 
Generally, the party chose typical populist communication to gain 
publicity, like breaking political taboos, which caused several verbal 
and physical conflicts between politicians (Aktuality.sk, 2012), and 
raising awareness on corruption affairs. This discourse and their 
political flexibility is apparently very beneficial for the party that 
succeeded in 2016 elections as the third biggest party (SME.sk, 2016).
Discourse of Party Programmes of Populist Parties
The discourse of political parties is dissected through a meticulous 
study of the party programmes in this section. Firstly, the Sweden 
Democrats and True Finns will be compared as the members of 
the old democracies. Next, the comparison of the representatives 
of the new democracies, ANO and OĽaNO will follow. Lastly, the 
discursive approach of old and new democratic populists will be 
compared. 
Populism in Old Democracies: Comparison of Sweden Democrats 
and True Finns 
The party programmes of Sweden Democrats and True Finns have 
been issued in 2014 and 2015 respectively. Both present a very dense 
version of the main points addressed by both parties, with sufficient 
space to point out the most important perceived shortcomings and 
solutions. The party programmes/manifests are simple, and use 
common language in order to be widely accessible to readers of 
every strata of society in respective countries.
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Definition of the People
The people in terms of SD are proud, courageous people, who have 
been living in Sweden for a very long time and have a particularly 
long and special historic role. They are people who love Sweden 
and are part of the genetic and cultural heritage of Europe (Sweden 
Democrats Party Programme, 2014). The people are the ones that 
love Sweden, the language, its natural wonders. They are the elderly, 
who are forgotten, the young who are not given a chance, because 
others are taking their benefits. They are the Swedish employees, 
the everyday heroes at the workplace. A lawful resident population 
which belongs to the Nordic, European, Christian and Western 
cultural heritage (Sweden Democrats Party Programme, 2014).
True Finns approach the definition of people similarly. The real 
Finns are working people who are misused by the system and the 
establishment, taken for granted by the elites. Their homes are 
invaded by foreigners. Immigration puts them at risk because they 
lose their jobs. They are taxpayers, who do not get their money 
back, but they are nonetheless defiant and proud (True Finns Party 
Programme, 2015), much like in the presentation of the people by 
SD. 
Definition of the Enemy
a) Cultural Enemy
While True Finns and Sweden Democrats originate from different 
Nordic countries, their definition of the enemy is quite similar. 
The external enemy of the ‘true people’ is the migrant, the distant 
‘other’, the one who is inherently different from the Finns or Swedes. 
Immigration will change the population profile and is responsible 
for the formation of ghettos, ethnic conflicts and disrupted societal 
cohesion. It is not about race anymore, it has more to do with 
culture. Both True Finns and Sweden Democrats see the enemy in 
Islamic faith, finding it incompatible with their cultural heritage of 
West, Nordic and Christian roots. 
True Finns, in order to make their point against immigration play the 
‘number game’, making numbers the ammunition in the everyday 
discourse about their own perceived danger of immigration. This is 
visible on the page 2 of their Immigration Policy part of the Party 
Programme, where they establish, that Finland has 300.000 people 
born outside of Finland, which makes up for 5,5% of the entire 
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Finnish population; and over the last 10 years, this number has been 
increasing by 20.000 people a year (True Finns Party Programme, 
2015). 
Immigration, True Finns stipulate, is driving the people out of the 
city, taking homes of hard-working and lower income Finns and 
keeping the poor away from the welfare system set up to protect 
them. “Taxpayers are leaving Helsinki and only unemployed 
migrants are left” (True Finns Party Programme, 2015). The same 
can be said for low-income foreign students, who are “enjoying 
free education in Finland [and] are consuming financial resources 
and [taking away Finnish] student places” (True Finns Party 
Programme, 2015). 
Dual citizenship is also a trait of the immigrant enemy since it 
represents a security risk. The question of loyalty to another country 
is posed as a threat to Finland as well as Sweden. In Finland it is 
mostly linked and implied for the Russians, which True Finns mark 
as a threat on its own, linking the volatility of the relationship to 
Russia with the evidence from Ukraine and the crisis there.
Crime is a major threat in Sweden. Organized crime is taken as a 
factor, which puts the country at risk. It is insinuated that organized 
crime is coming from the outside, from the immigrants. They 
become a social welfare burden, not only by being on welfare, but 
undermining Sweden’s liberal tradition and cultural heritage. Both 
parties see language to be under threat from the outside world, 
particularly because of the multicultural practices, which are there 
to protect the immigrants and cater to their needs but not to the 
ethnic co-nationals, Swedes, respectively Finns. 
b) The Establishment
The internal enemy, coming from Swedes and Finns themselves 
is the establishment. Their actions, by catering to the needs of big 
business, the EU, and immigrants instead of taking care of their 
own people, are against the people. The establishment, by putting 
in place a bureaucracy which is treating the common people like 
a bully, rather than a helping hand, seems distant and detached 
from the people. It works against the cultural heritage and history 
of Swedes and Finns respectively and is therefore, in their eyes, 
corrupt and unfit to rule. 
For True Finns, in the 2015 party programme, the enemy is found 
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in many different spheres. The thuggish bureaucracy which keeps 
the investments and development at bay bullies the ‘small people’ 
and impedes the overall advancement of society. It is important to 
note that the enemy is found in the established political parties like 
the Centre Party, National Coalition Party or the Social Democratic 
Party. They are deemed responsible for the policies which destroyed 
the competitiveness of Finland. 
One of the main enemies for True Finns is the rigid EU bureaucracy 
which halts progress. The EU is considered an enemy because it 
imposes climate control regulations, which will cost Finland billions 
of Euros of high energy costs for industry and consumers in the long 
run. Finland, as a sovereign country, should be able to decide for 
themselves what to do. For SD, established parties have let Sweden 
deteriorate into an unnatural and culturally mixed country, which 
has forgotten about their cultural heritage and proud history. The 
politicians and the people that rule the Swedish society have turned 
Sweden “into a less amazing country and they did it by misguided 
priorities” (Sweden Democrats Party Programme, 2014). 
Populism and Democracy in Old Democracies
Both True Finns and Sweden Democrats approach democracy as a 
tradition, a way of life passed on by generations. This is seen in both 
of their programmes as statements of a long tradition of democracy, 
Western culture and adherence to human rights and dignity, 
alongside with gender equality and a welfare state. While they try 
to keep these achievements, they are nonetheless exclusionary in 
their practices. Their approach is in some consideration anti-liberal, 
since they do not believe in the plurality that can exist within a 
society per se. They reserve most of the services of the state, such as 
welfare, healthcare or other benefits for their co-ethnics, the ethnic 
Finns and ethnic Swedes. This can be seen within their exclusive 
rights for ethnics in the approach to welfare, education, language 
policies and healthcare. 
This is somewhat typical for Nordic countries and is labelled ‘welfare 
chauvinism’ (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990). “Welfare chauvinism 
is employed in combination with appeals for restoring ‘traditional 
values’, and reinforcing order and authority” (Nordensvard & 
Ketola, 2015: 365). In this respect, the populist radical right combines 
welfare chauvinist stances with authoritarian arguments, opposing 
liberal permissiveness and tolerance of migrants, ethnic minorities, 
19
and other groups that are deemed to deviate from the ‘common 
man in the street’ standards (Rydgren, 2006: 11). This makes it 
harder for all people to access democracy, and thus, rather than 
being a corrective to democracy, Nordic populists, or populism 
in old democracies, seems to, from the evidence provided, pose a 
threat to democracy. 
Populism in New Democracies: Comparison of ANO and OĽaNO
The political programme of ANO had more of a general character 
using rather simplistic language that populist parties usually 
choose as ‘the language of the people’ (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013: 
14). On the other hand, OĽaNO’s programme was not only bigger 
in volume, but also finely structured in its argumentative character, 
which evokes a level of professionalism in defining policy problems 
and solutions, in many cases based on previous research of e.g. the 
OECD or Eurobarometer (OĽaNO Political Programme, 2016: 14, 
19, 31). Their arguments thus had much more representative value. 
In both documents, the set of four categories was detected that in 
most of the cases overlapped, although there were some crucial 
differences as well.
Definition of the People
Both parties support the idea of the citizen being above the 
government, of a citizen who creates laws and policies and of good, 
poor citizens who are victims of a decayed establishment. ANO, 
as well as OĽaNO chose a fairly balanced approach to all citizens 
that does not put preference to certain groups. ANO tackles the 
problems of socially disadvantaged groups, people with disabilities 
(ANO Political Programme, 2017: 19), as well as all age groups 
from children care to the retirement system. OĽaNO also adds the 
problem of homeless people (OĽaNO Political Programme, 2016: 
43) and ethnically marginalised groups, such as Roma people. 
The Roma question constitutes an important part of OĽaNO’s 
programme in particular. OĽaNO focuses mainly on the integration 
in the education system, labour market, housing and society, 
while also highlighting the problem of negative media attention to 
Roma issues, which perpetuate stereotypes and prejudice (OĽaNO 
Political Programme, 2016: 60-63). The Slovak party aims at building 
the bridges between the majority population and the minority, 
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implementing anti-discrimination laws and ending stereotypes. 
The inclusion of Roma as part of the ‘people’, not as the ‘Other’ 
poses as a contra-argument against the usual perception of Roma 
as an internal threat to ethnic homogeneity depicted in countries of 
CEE. 
On the other hand, ANO ignores the topic of Roma, even though it 
is nowadays the biggest minority in their country (Vlada.cz, 2017)*. 
During Babiš’s last visit to a Roma village for a commemoration 
of the holocaust against the Roma, Babiš called the concentration 
camp only a “work camp in which Roma at least worked, unlike 
nowadays” (iDNES.cz, 2016). The shift from populism to ethnic 
nationalism cannot be applied to the position of the whole party, 
but it indicates the visible difference between ‘normal people’ and 
Roma who do not work and who are dependent on social benefits. 
Moreover, the prime minister of the government in which ANO 
was a coalition partner claimed that ANO never put forward any 
suggestions on solving the Roma issue (Aktuálne.cz, 2016), which 
only insinuates that their primary attention is on ethnic Czech 
citizens.
Definition of the Enemy
a) Cultural Enemy
Both parties put the protection of the national identity as one of 
their priorities, however ANO focuses mainly on the migration 
threat, while OĽaNO sees the biggest external enemy in Russia. 
In the case of ANO, illegal migration is a major problem, because 
Europe leaves its borders open helping terrorism to expand, 
threatening the national security (ANO Political Programme 2017: 
21). Overall, they propose a very practical approach of protection 
of the Schengen borders and promotion of migration solutions in 
origin countries by putting asylum procedures in place outside 
of Europe and highlighting the final word of the Czech Republic 
in groups of migrants they are willing to relocate. They do not 
specifically tackle the question whether migrants who come legally 
and integrate into the host society, will be seen as part of ‘the people’ 
*  In comparison, the Roma community in Slovakia is approximately twice the size of the one 
in the Czech Republic, while Slovakia has half of the overall population of the Czech Republic (Den-
níkN.sk, 2016). The size and very bad living conditions in Slovakia for Roma might also be a factor of 
policy urgency but it is mainly important how parties approached this ethnic minority – whether as a 
part of the general population or an outsider. 
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in the future. Similar practical and rational position is presented 
by OĽaNO, which claimed that “migrants mostly see the region 
of Central Europe as only transit station on their way to Western 
Europe” (OĽaNO Political Programme, 2016: 127), while stressing 
the need of integration in case migrants want to become part of the 
host society, ‘the people’.
Nonetheless, OĽaNO perceived Russia as the bigger threat due to 
territorial revisionism in Ukraine and espionage in other European 
states, which, according to the party, makes it unacceptable to 
normalise relations with Russia, without the return to the previous 
status-quo (OĽaNO Political Programme, 2016: 126). Undoubtedly, 
the Slovak geographical proximity to Russia makes the perceived 
threat bigger than for their Czech counterparts. Thus, ANO only 
voiced a need to develop relations between EU and Russia without 
specifying Russian failures of compliance with international law 
(ANO Political Programme, 2017: 14). However, it is common 
practice that populist parties in CEE often define the ‘Other’ as an 
external threat coming from Russia, which fits OĽaNO’s approach 
perfectly.
b) The Establishment
Both parties perceive the establishment as their main enemy, which 
they are fighting against, since it does not adhere to the citizens’ 
interests. The establishment consists mainly of corrupt elites, 
outdated, corrupt, non-transparent and ineffective bureaucracy, 
biased, slow and undersized justice and lobbyist groups which are 
not regulated, as well as too involved in public policy while their 
interests differ from the ones of citizens. The most often mentioned 
characteristics of the establishment is the corruption that should 
have been ended after the fall of communism in 1989, but on the 
contrary, it is still spreading, not only through the government, but 
also within bureaucracy in e.g. EU funds, and other policies like 
health care (ANO Political Programme, 2017: 1; OĽaNO Political 
Programme, 2016: 8, 51). Oligarchy and clientelism are another 
problem coming from the establishment, and ANO declared that 
“the government is not run by the prime minister, but by a variety 
of behind-the-scenes groups, lobbyists and consultants” (ANO 
Political Programme, 2017: 1). 
It is peculiar that both actors do not perceive the European Union as 
the enemy, as part of the establishment working against the people. 
22
ANO claims that “despite the supranational institutions, the Czech 
Republic has a greater influence on events on the continent” (ANO 
Political Programme, 2017: 13), while OĽaNO committed itself to 
contribute to increasing citizens’ confidence in the European project 
(OĽaNO Political Programme, 2016: 128).
The main difference between ANO and OĽaNO was the inclusion 
of certain political parties to the establishment. ANO profiled itself 
generally against right as well as left-wing parties who are corrupt 
and influenced by lobbyist groups (ANO Political Programme, 
2017: 1). In case of OĽaNO, the discourse about corrupt elites is 
targeted more specifically at the main government left-wing party 
Smer-SD. OĽaNO specifically held them responsible for “crumbling 
roads, hospitals and schools”, due to the lack of investment from 
EU funds. This is the case because Smer-SD were in power for nine 
out of ten overall years of the EU project funding period (OĽaNO 
Political Programme, 2016: 51). 
This anti-Smer-SD rhetoric fits to Pareto’s (2011) argument that 
connects anti-establishment discourse in CEE with national-
communism. Fico, the leader of Smer-SD, was a member of the 
Communist Party of Slovakia (SME.sk, 2003), and after the fall of 
communism, its political successor, the Slovak Democratic Left 
SDĽ (Aktuality.sk, 2017a). However, he did not manage to hold any 
government positions in SDĽ, and thus established his own party 
Smer-SD that in 2002 integrated the political survivors of the failing 
post-communist party, SDĽ (SME.sk, 2004).
Nevertheless, the anti-establishment rhetoric depicted in communist 
remanence does not apply for the Czech Republic because there 
the Communist Party is still a rather successful actor which ANO 
does not specifically target, while ANO’s party leader Babiš was an 
alleged agent of ‘State Security’ (Štátna Bezpečnost - ŠtB)*, secret 
police force, as well as an ordinary member of the Communist Party 
before 1989. He claims that his membership was purely because of 
the benefits it brought, not the communist ideology and that is why 
now he considers his anti-establishment crusade as a compensation 
for the lack of courage to rebel during communism (EuroZprávy.
cz, 2016). His previous links to communism might be a reason 
why their anti-establishment discourse stays symmetrical for both 
political right and left.
*  According to the preserved records, Babiš was supposed to provide intel on people sus-
pected of bribery and corruption. Babiš denies any allegations, while saying that he only came into 
contact with secret service officers who were interested in business activities (Aktuality.sk, 2017b).
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Populism and Democracy
Looking at the coverage of democratic principles in the programme, 
ANO only declares its priority to promote democracy in the country, 
and willingness to fight any kind of right or left-wing extremism 
and religious fundamentalism (ANO Political Programme, 2017: 
23). They also do not specifically open the question of populism, 
and its relation to democratic values. Therefore, since they ignored 
the problem of ethnically marginalised groups, and focused 
mainly on the critique of all political parties, the justice system and 
bureaucracy, their position seems to lean more towards the threat 
rather than the corrective to the democracy. In the public sphere, 
many voiced a fear of the negative impact that ANO can have on 
democracy, while calling it an ‘oligarch’s party’ (Kopeček, 2016: 
726). Reflex.cz (2017) even compared the victory of ANO in the last 
elections to the year 1946, when communists rose to power, because 
of the anti-systemic and anti-democratic parallel between ANO and 
the Communist Party.
On the other hand, OĽaNO considers strengthening the democracy 
as their main priority in the programme, due to a wave of extremist 
and populist groups that “undermines foundations of European 
integration” and democracy (OĽaNO Political Programme, 2016: 
125). Specifically, their approach to populism is rather paradoxical 
since they “want populism to end” (OĽaNO Political Programme, 
2016: 144), while officially belonging to the typical populist parties. 
The stigma of populism connecting it with far-right rise might 
result in OĽaNO distancing themselves from such characteristics in 
the public eye. 
However, there are also positive sides of the specific type of 
populism which OĽaNO also encompasses. They highlight the 
need for a strong civic society that they see as the main pillar of 
democracy and support more citizens’ involvement not only in 
policy formulation but also in decision-making (OĽaNO Political 
Programme, 2016: 138-140). This rhetoric indicates a clear shift 
towards direct democracy that pursues the agenda of giving 
back the power to the pure people which might cure the political 
apathy of many citizens when it comes to public policy. The clear 
willingness to give more control over policies to the citizens, to 
strengthen the checks and balances in the governance system, to 
point to non-transparent and corrupt decisions and to incorporate 
different social and ethnic groups into society, such as Roma, puts 
populism of OĽaNO more in the corrective position of democracy.
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Comparing Populism in Old and New Democracies 
As populism is an anti-status quo discourse (Panizza, 2005: 3), one 
can detect that there are many similarities within the populist 
parties of the old and new democracies. They all have the typical 
features in common – they are a form of political expression which 
agitates, speculates and exaggerates. But most of all, they deny the 
possibility that the status quo can go on, and there is a need for the 
people to take back power. 
This is presented in the common denominator all of the parties have 
– an utter disregard for the establishment. It is interesting that ANO 
does not adhere to the typical Central Eastern European definition 
of the establishment. It does not take the initiative to blame the 
corrupt descendants of the former communist regime, which 
can be explained with the fact that their leader, Babiš, was put in 
connection with the old communist regime. While this might be the 
case, the ANO party is still moving towards a more general facet 
of the populist discourse, which targets politicians in power, big 
business interests, and lobbyist groups – in general, elites detached 
from the populus. OĽaNO, on the other hand, still sees a big threat 
in the leftovers of the communist regime in their definitions of 
the establishment, connecting it to the left leaning party Smer-SD, 
which has formed out of the ruins of the Communist Party. 
The biggest difference is most likely that the establishment is 
considered to be the EU in Sweden and Finland. Central Eastern 
European populist parties would beg to differ in this regard, 
since they count on the stable position of the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia within the EU and find it being able to help their countries, 
not halt their progress. Sweden Democrats, as well as True Finns 
see the supranational EU as a threat to their countries’ sovereignty. 
This approach of the True Finns and the Sweden Democrats can 
be partially explained by the fact that they find themselves in 
nationalist and far-right place of the political spectrum, while Czech 
and Slovak parties are both situated on the right, but on a more 
central position. On the other hand, the explanation might be that 
they receive less benefits from their position within the EU than the 
CEE states do.
There seems to be a discrepancy in the way in which OĽaNO 
defines the cultural enemy as opposed to previous research on CEE 
populist parties. While ANO disregards the question of the Roma 
(even though they are the biggest ethnic minority in the Czech 
Republic), OĽaNO takes steps to include the Roma in ‘the people’, 
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which is an exception to the common populist discourse in CEE 
targeting the internal enemy represented by the ethnic minorities 
within the state. 
In all cases, ‘the enemy’ was defined as the one coming from the 
outside. This is done by finding the threat in immigration and 
migrants, which is supposed to have a homogenizing internal 
effect. Particularly interesting is that migration did not seem to 
be an issue beforehand in Slovakia or Czech Republic, since these 
countries were not the usual destination of migrants, but the recent 
refugee crisis in Europe could explain the inclusion of the policy in 
the agenda. Due to the European relocation scheme, the perceived 
threat is more tangible for the public, and with populist discourse 
evolving around these questions the Central Eastern European 
populists can attract voters. Migration seems to become an integral 
part of populism in both new and old democracies, however the 
approach of ANO and OĽaNO stays much more rational and 
focuses mainly on illegal migration that threatens the security of 
the state. 
There was also another external enemy, besides migrants, found in 
the parties. Both True Finns and the Slovak OĽaNO perceive Russia 
as a threat to their countries, which was most likely intensified 
because of the war in Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea. 
The Russian threat usually appears in populist discourse in CEE 
countries (Ţăranu, 2012: 138), however, the relative proximity of 
Finland and Slovakia to Russian spheres of influence and historical 
experiences with the Soviet Union might have influenced the 
perception of the enemy, independently of belonging to old or new 
democracies.
While some authors (Pauwels, 2011; Tăranu, 2012) claim that the 
liberal democracy paradigm is more under threat from populism in 
CEE, since their democracy is not embedded, the opposite has been 
found in this research. OĽaNO is an example of a populist party 
working more on inclusion of all strata of society, arguing for more 
direct and participative democracy, as well as a return of the power 
to the people, while keeping intact the minority safeguards and the 
checks and balances of the liberal democratic system. This being the 
indicator of populism as a corrective to democracy in CEE. 
On the other hand, True Finns and SD are aiming at the ethnic base 
of their co-nationals with ethnic welfare chauvinism and destruction 
of the minority programs and multicultural practices which are an 
integral part of liberal democracy. This puts Nordic populist parties 
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in a position leaning towards illiberal majoritarian principles. Lastly, 
ANO in its programme does not make any considerable attempts 
at liberal democracy, while attacking all kinds of extremism, both 
from the left and the right. However, it ignores the issue of the 
Roma as a marginalised group, does not devote much space for 
tools of promoting democracy and focuses on critique of all political 
parties and bureaucracy. Taking into consideration not only their 
programme, but their overall discourse, this party leans more 
towards the threat to democracy, as defined by other researchers 
(Kopeček, 2016; Reflex.cz, 2017).
Conclusion
This research has revealed that populism seems to adapt and move 
towards a certain modus operandi which is typical for both old and 
new democracies. New democracies, so it seems, have been moving 
from the problem of the internal enemy (although the internal enemy 
is still persistent in the ideas about the establishment), towards an 
external one. All of the researched parties have been on the right 
ideological political spectrum, thus the enemy is found in migrants 
and different cultures, but also, in a closer external enemy, such as 
Russia in the case of Finland and Slovakia. 
The implications of the findings point to the conclusion that CEE 
populist parties move towards the same way of reasoning although 
there are important exceptions. While the Scandinavian populists 
seem to be moving towards exclusive majoritarian rule, and cultural 
racism in their programs, the CEE populists present a chance 
for correction of democratic rule by trying to include formerly 
marginalized groups, such as Roma, with empowering them and 
making them part of the populus, which now has only one common 
internal enemy – the establishment. 
Further research is to be conducted in order to find out if the 
populists from the left side of the spectrum can adhere to the 
commonalities between populist parties. One thing is certain: 
populism has become a stronger part of the political playground, 
making moves towards established politics, as can be seen in Italy 
with the Five Star Movement, in Slovenia with United Left, Germany 
with the Alternative für Deutschland or the Front National’s Marie 
Le Penn’s success in the French presidential campaign as well as 
earlier success of UKIP with the Brexit plans. A common identified 
denominator can help change the way we talk about populism and 
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make it easier to identify when or how they pose a threat to liberal 
democracy or present an advancement inside it. 
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